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This research traces the sources of differences in national economic stimulus programs designed and set 
up in response to the economic crisis 2008/09. Based on a comparative case study of the stimulus 
programs of Germany and France, I argue that differences in the national configuration of the economies 
and not solely economic preconditions explain the diverging outcomes. Using Vivien Schmidt’s “Varieties 
of Capitalism”-framework from 2002, I show that corporatist traditions still have a significant impact on 
policy outcomes in Germany whereas in France various interest groups have to cope with differing 
conditions for influence exertion. In fact, the balance between social- and business-supporting measures 
of the German stimulus program is a prime example of the German state as an “enabling facilitator”. The 
French stimulus program, that is significantly smaller in contrast to its German counterpart, exhibits a 
strong support of the industry reflecting the weak position of trade-unions vis-à-vis businesses and the 
state. Overall, the paper provides a comprehensive approach to comparativist policy-research by taking 
into account economic, institutional and political factors. It shall serve as the starting point for further 
research in the field of governmental interventions during the crises of the recent years.  
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1 Introduction: Puzzle – Varieties of State Interventions in Response to 
the Crisis 2008/2009 
Against the backdrop of a predicted convergence of national economies towards a common model of 
capitalism (cf. Schmidt 2008: 304), the variety in the reactions of national governments in dealing with the 
financial and economic crisis in 2008/09 (hereinafter referred to as “the crisis”) appears puzzling. 
Particularly considering the size of economic stimulus packages – relative to GDP – of countries that were 
hit by the crisis to a similar degree, one would assume to observe more similarities. But in fact, stimulus 
packages varied widely ranging from around 0.5% of GDP (e.g. France [according to OECD figures] or 
Italy) to more than 5% of GDP (e.g. U.S.) (cf. OECD 2009: 19). Although one could argue that this 
variance is due to structural economic differences of the countries, the data indicates differently. Countries 
with supposedly similar structural economic preconditions reacted to the crisis with completely different 
forms of interventions in terms of the composition and magnitude of the stimulus packages (cf. Saha/von 
Weizsäcker 2009; Watt 2009). Why, for instance, has Germany set up an extensive short-term labor 
support program while France has not (cf. Saha/von Weizsäcker 2009: 4), even though the French 
unemployment rate has gone up whereas the German rate remained relatively stable during the crisis (cf. 
Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2009:5ff/14)? This paper takes this puzzle and the lack of explanatory power of 
purely economic approaches as a starting point for an analysis of the different forms of state intervention 
during the crisis from a political economy perspective. The underlying hypothesis implies that political 
science oriented approaches to the issue can add essential insights. More specifically, based on the 
“Varieties of Capitalism”-literature, I will primarily draw on political and institutional factors in relation to 
economic factors in order to explore the sources of the large variation in policy responses. I will argue that 
differences in the national configuration of a political economy are primarily responsible for the variation 
in policy responses to the same economic phenomenon. However, due to the limited frame of this paper, 
the research does not intend to be fully capable of providing proof for causal-relationships. It rather aims 
at highlighting possible explanations for a policy phenomenon by means of qualitative analysis.  
1.1 Research Question and Relevance 
The above identified empirical puzzle leads us to the following question that also constitutes the research 
question for this paper:   
How can variations in national economic stimulus programs designed and set up in response to 
the financial and economic crisis in 2008/09 be explained? What explains variations in magnitude 
– relative to GDP? What explains variations in composition?  
There is a long list of scholars, particularly economists, who already dealt with the economic stimulus 
packages of 2008/09 (cf. Krugman 2009b; Watt 2009; Saha/von Weizsäcker 2009; Prasad/Sorkin 2009; 
Illing 2013; etc.). But while they recognize that there are enormous variations between the different 
programs, they seem primarily interested in the economic impact of different measures or focus on purely 
economic explanations for the variations (cf. Saha/von Weizsäcker 2009: 4). Therefore this paper 
constitutes an attempt to enrich the existing literature in this particular field by shedding light on the 
drivers of the state interventionist policies in response to the crisis. Another objective of this paper is to 
increase our understanding of national policy-making and how the institutional setting influences the 
content of policies.  
By drawing on the comparative string of the political economy literature, this research follows Weber’s 
and Schmitz’s analysis of the national bank rescue packages that were initiated as a first response to the 
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crisis in 2008 (cf. Weber/Schmitz 2011). In line with their paper, I will refer to a variety of authors within 
the field of comparative political economy in order to capture the sources of divergences in policy 
outcomes.  
1.2 Overview of the Financial and Economic Crisis in 2008/09 
The financial and economic crisis of 2008/09 with its effects and implications have already been discussed 
in great detail by many different authors and scholars (e.g. Krugman 2009a/2009b; Illing 2013). Yet, I 
want to give a brief overview of the developments leading to an unparalleled intervention of governments 
in the markets (cf. Eicker-Wolf et al. 2009: 20). Up until the crash of the American bank Lehman Brothers 
– an event that is widely considered as the starting point for the global financial and economic crisis1 – 
markets were characterized by “lax regulations and a flood of liquidity” (Stiglitz 2009). After an almost 
decade-long global wave of neo-liberalism that included privatization and liberal regulations in most 
advanced economies, the anti-cyclical stimulus packages set up in response to the crisis represented a 
radical break with the preceding economic policies in many Western countries (cf. Eicker-Wolf et al. 2009: 
20). Hence, the question to be asked is what has led to the crisis in the first place, and why was this 
(financial) crisis so much more severe than others so that it triggered such a fierce reaction by 
governments?  
Unlike the dotcom-crisis in the beginning of the 21st century, the financial crisis of 2008/09 had serious 
consequences on the real economy. The American subprime crisis is commonly viewed as the trigger that 
led first to a global financial crisis and in a second consequence to an economic crisis. It was the result of 
an era of loose monetary policy of the U.S. Federal Reserve (Fed) in the early 2000s (cf. Illing 2013: 20f). 
The Fed’s low-interest policy gave many citizens the opportunity to take out a mortgage loan to buy a 
house even if they did not have the financial resources to bring in substantial collateral for the mortgage 
(ibid)2. In order to spread the risk of potential credit defaults, banks came up with asset-backed securities 
and credit-default swaps that mixed risky loans with triple A rated loans. By means of securitization high-
risk “subprime” mortgages found their way on the balance sheets of banks across the globe. This meant 
that once an increasing number of subprime mortgage takers defaulted, not only U.S.-banks were affected, 
but also small, industry-focused banks such as the German IKB whose core-business was business 
financing – not trading credit-default swaps (cf. Illing 2013: 21). When the Fed increased interest rates, the 
rates of the variable-interest loans increased as well which led to a vast number of loan-defaults, which, of 
course, could not be covered by  asset collaterals as house-prices had gone down (cf. Krugman 2008b: 
167) 3. Thus, due to the securitization of subprime mortgages banks around the world had to write off a 
large part of their assets (cf. Illing 2013: 21ff). The large amount of write-offs brought many banks in 
trouble as regards to their refinancing on the internal bank market. The banks’ liquidity problems 
eventually translated into a tightening of credit to businesses and other banks (ibid; ECB 2008). At this 
                                                 
1 However, first symptoms of the crisis – even in Germany – could have already been observed in 2007 (cf. Illing 
2013:20ff). 
2 Unlike borrowers in Germany, who have to guarantee a loan with their entire assets, American borrowers only have 
to guarantee with the property and house to which the mortgage belongs (cf. Illing 2013: 20). Consequently, the 
value of the mortgages went down rapidly once the housing bubble burst and real-estate prices fell rapidly.  
3 “Even the gradual initial decline in home prices, however, undermined the assumptions on which the boom in 
subprime lending was based. Remember, the key rationale for this lending was the belief that it didn’t really matter, 
from the lender’s point of view, whether the borrower could actually make the mortgage payments: as long as house 
prices kept rising, troubled borrowers could always refinance or pay off their mortgage by selling their house. As 
soon as home prices started falling instead of rising, and houses became hard to sell, default rates began rising” 
(Krugman 2008b: 167). 
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point, governments around the world felt compelled to step in: On the one hand, the example of Lehman 
Brothers had shown that bankruptcy of any major bank would have disastrous effects on other banks in 
the system. Therefore governments were pressured to provide banks in need with direct liquidity or 
indirect guarantees. On the other hand, the negative effects of the “credit crunch” on businesses and the 
upcoming recession had to be countered with economic stimulus programs (cf. Illing 2013: 34f). 
2 Theoretical Background 
Based on the research question formulated above, the research conducted in this paper will be elaborated 
on throughout this section by first identifying the dependent variable and secondly the explanatory, i.e. 
independent variables.  Furthermore, I will give a brief introduction to the most relevant theories and 
frameworks that are used in this paper. 
2.1 Theoretical Background: Cornerstones of Economic Theory 
When talking about governmental interventions – particularly in the context of the crisis 2008/09 – 
people mostly refer to economic stabilization policies in a Keynesian sense (cf. Farrell/Quiggin 2012; 
Economist 2013). Keynes demanded “active government intervention – printing more money and, if 
necessary, spending heavily on public works – to fight unemployment during slumps” (Krugman 2009a). 
The fast renaissance of Keynesian policies in the wake of the crisis can be regarded as rather surprising 
considering the pre-2008 prevalence of supply-side economics particularly relying on deregulation and 
liberalization driven by what is called the “Washington Consensus”(cf. Farrell/Quiggin 2012: 2). In order 
to fully grasp the magnitude of the policy shift that has taken place in many countries during the years 
2008/09, I want to briefly compare those two cornerstones of economic theory.  
In its simplest form, the two theory strings can be contrasted as follows: Whereas Keynes demands an 
“active stimulation of the demand of the state” (Mankiw/Taylor 2008: 879) in times of rising 
unemployment and sluggish economic growth, the concept of the Washington Consensus that goes along 
with the ideas of Milton Friedman supports the notion of a minimal state that only provides general 
conditions so that the market can regulate itself (“night watchman state”) (cf. Friedman 1963: 22ff). 
According to Keynes, unless the government does not actively intervene in the market, the “aggregate 
demand” in an economy will decrease in case of ongoing pessimism as households will spend less on 
consumer goods and companies will invest less (cf. Mankiw/Taylor 2008: 879). This in turn would lead to 
a lower production rate and higher unemployment, which again decreases the aggregate demand. By 
means of a loose fiscal and monetary policy in times of crises and stricter policies in times of growth, the 
government can control waves of pessimism and volatilities (ibid). Friedman and the proponents of the 
Washington Consensus, in contrast, rejected that fiscal policy could be used to stimulate demand and 
argued that government interventions would only lead to the risk of higher inflation rates and distortions 
(cf. Friedman 1963). Instead they advocate – among other measures – fiscal discipline and supply-side 
economic policies such as the flexibilization of labor markets and tax reforms (cf. CID Harvard). 
Governments in the Western World have more or less followed both theories over time: After the 
installation of the Bretton Woods system they mostly followed Keynes, but with the beginning of the 
1980s liberalization and deregulation became increasingly popular (cf. Farell/Quiggin 2012: 1f). For the 
frame of this paper it is essential to consider that economic policies of advanced economies in the pre-
2008 decade have been primarily inspired by the ideas of the Washington Consensus and that government 
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interventions have been quite limited up until 2008 (cf. Eicker-Wolf et al. 2009: 20; Farrell/Quiggin 
2012: 2). 
2.2 Dependent Variable: National Economic Stimulus Programs in 2008/09 
As already indicated above, all OECD and almost all G20-countries intervened to some extent in the 
market with the set-up of national economic stimulus programs (cf. OECD 2009; Prasad/Sorkin 2009). 
The dependent variable is thus the size and composition of national stimulus programs designed and set 
up in response to the crisis. Once the relevant cases are selected, I will analyze the areas of the stimulus 
programs with the highest variation among the selected countries. A qualitative analysis of the most 
important measures contained in the different national stimulus programs will be performed in section 4 
of this paper. 
2.3 Definition of Independent Variables and Operationalization 
What drives governments to set up a large-scale economic stimulus package? Why do some governments 
favor certain sectors over others, and why do other governments focus on rather broad measures such as 
investments in infrastructure (cf. Saha/von Weizsäcker 2009)? As stated above, the underlying hypothesis 
of this paper is that a purely economic reasoning cannot explain the large variations exhibited in the 
stimulus programs. The following explanatory variables are primarily based on the “Varieties of 
Capitalism”-string of comparative political theory (cf. Hall/Soskice 2001; Schmidt 2002; Amable 2003) 
that would posit that variations in economic policies in response to the crisis are rooted in the differences 
in the institutional configuration of an economy. Though assessed separately in the context of this 
research, each of the below defined independent variables constitutes an essential component of the 
institutional framework of an economy.   
However, in order to enrich my line of arguments, I will also point out alternative approaches and state to 
what extent they may be able to explain the issue at hand or not.  
2.3.1 Excursus: Introduction to the Varieties of Capitalism Approach 
Since the line of arguments in this paper is largely driven by the “Varieties of Capitalism” approach (VoC), 
it seems sensible to provide an introduction to this particular string of the comparative political economy 
literature.  
The classification of countries into different types of economies (cf. Katzenstein 1985; Hall/Soskice 
2001), capitalist structures or models (cf. Schmidt 2002; Amable 2003), welfare systems (cf. Esping-
Andersen 1990) or policy networks (cf. Van Waarden 1992) has been one of the core issues political 
economists have dealt with in recent decades. By “clustering” countries in specific groups scholars sought 
to explain several aspects within a political economy, such as how governments of certain countries react 
to a changing economic environment, to what extent governments intervene in the economy, why certain 
economic policies are working for some countries but not for others, whether countries will converge 
around a single model of capitalism in the ongoing process of globalization or whether there is a superior 
model of an economy (cf. Hall/Soskice 2001: 1ff; Crouch 2005: 439). Most approaches reason that 
structural and institutional differences are the result of historical developments, local and geologic realities 
or major policy changes in reaction to deep-cutting crises (cf. Katzenstein 1985: 34ff). Those structural 
and institutional differences then, they argue, impact on the choice of policies a government pursues (cf. 
Schmidt 2002: 108). In the classical VoC-literature – i.e. Hall/Soskice (2002) – the specific historical 
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development of a country is “centered on their dominant method of coordination between economic 
actors and the respective complementary institutions” (Weber/Schmitz 2011: 646). In other words, VoC-
scholars argue that the way different actors within a system interact with each other ultimately determines 
policy outcomes and shapes how “countries react to external shocks” (ibid). 
This approach thus generally appears to be suitable to capture the differential reactions of national 
governments in response to the financial crisis as it expands the purely economic point of view to a more 
multi-faceted perspective on the drivers of policy outcomes. However, since the VoC-literature consists of 
a plurality of approaches and classifications based on different characteristics, I chose to primarily rely on 
Vivien Schmidt’s categorization of national economies into three “ideal-typical models of capitalism” (cf. 
Schmidt 2002: 107). As I will elaborate in the following, Schmidt’s approach to the VoC is quite particular 
and differs in some aspects substantially from the “most widely used” (cf. Thelen 2012: 136; Crouch 2005: 
442) VoC-framework that has been introduced by Hall and Soskice in 2001. The reason for choosing 
Schmidt’s approach as a starting point – and thereby explicitly not following the approach that is mostly 
associated with VoC – is threefold. First of all, in contrast to the categorization of market economies into 
two types, namely liberal-market economies (LME) and coordinated-market economies (CME) (cf. 
Hall/Soskice 2001: 8ff), Schmidt adds “back” a third type of economy or capitalism, namely that of “state 
capitalism” (cf. Schmidt 110). Although scholars assumed towards the end of the twentieth century that 
this type of economy had “lost its empirical validity as much as its normative value” (Schmidt 2002: 111), 
it seems too restrictive to simplify today’s complex world down to two types of economies, particularly 
since the state underwent a significant renaissance in many countries during the crisis (cf. Hassel/Lütz 
2010). Even though purely state-led models are rarely to be found among the advanced economies, 
Schmidt observes a transformation of formerly “state-led” to now “state-enhanced” models of capitalism 
(Schmidt 2002: 111). She argues that “there is much to be learned from comparative analyses of those 
countries in which the state, having played a highly directive role in the past, continues to exercises 
significant albeit less direct influence” (ibid). This shall hold especially true for the cases being looked at 
here. If one tried to explain the variations in economic stimulus packages based on the distinction 
between CMEs and LMEs, one would not be able to take into account the stimulus packages of countries 
such as France, Italy or Spain that belong – according to Hall and Soskice – to a kind of residual-category 
called “Mediterranean” market economies (Hall/Soskice 2001: 21) that are not clearly defined within their 
framework, and thus would not be eligible for closer analysis.  
The other reason for why I chose to base my argumentation on Schmidt’s categorization is that she 
explicitly includes the state into her analysis. Instead of putting the firm at the center of her analysis, as Hall 
and Soskice (2001) or Amable do (2003), she specifically looks at the role of the state in the economy and 
how state and businesses as well as state and labor interact (cf. Schmidt 2002: 107ff). In order to 
understand how governments came to their decisions in response to the crisis, a categorization of 
economies that primarily focuses on the relation of “the firm” to other actors in the economy 
(Hall/Soskice 2001: 6ff) is evidently less useful. Naturally, the two reasons mentioned already are 
interdependent – explicitly including government relations with firms and labor as a differentiating 
characteristic of an economy naturally triggers the introduction of a third model.  
Finally, similarly to Hall and Soskice, Schmidt provides an “integrated” framework that not only 
distinguishes types of capitalism based on one specific factor, e.g. industrial relations, but on a plurality of 
factors (cf. Thelen 2012: 138) such as business relations, government relations, state characteristics and the 
relation between industry and finance (cf. Schmidt 2002: 113). This integrated perspective makes the 
framework quite comprehensive and suitable for an analysis of national stimulus programs.  
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Nevertheless, although Schmidt’s framework will be my primary point of reference in the VoC-literature, I 
will also incorporate aspects that are used by Hall and Soskice (2001) or Amable (2003) in order to 
distinguish between different systems. Hence, when I refer to the “VoC-approach” in the following, I 
primarily refer to Schmidt’s understanding of VoC– with its three types of capitalism –, but also to the 
general idea of the VoC to categorize different countries according to their institutional configuration. 
Moreover, I will focus only on the most relevant aspects of the framework omitting a closer consideration 
of e.g. “inter-firm relations” (Schmidt 2002: 113ff) as government-business relations are more relevant in 
this context. 
2.3.2 The Notion of Institutional Configuration 
The notion of “institutional configuration” is often used by scholars without further specifying the 
concept. In order to clarify the concept, I will give a brief explanation for the term. The term “institutional 
configuration” is primarily used by VoC-scholars to describe the “interplay of institutions” (Höpner 
2005:333). More precisely it is said that the “models of capitalism debate focuses on interaction effects 
between institutions within production systems” (ibid). Labor relations, corporate governance or the 
financial structure are examples of those “production regime institutions” (ibid). Thus, the way trade-
unions negotiate wages with businesses or how interest groups can exert influence in the policy-
formulation process depends on the institutional configuration of an economy. Therefore, when I 
hypothesize that the institutional configuration of a political economy impacts on policy-outcomes, I 
essentially argue that the specific characteristics of a country’s political economy in terms of the relation 
between those production regime institutions determine policy-outcomes. 
2.3.3 IV1 and IV2: Government Relations 
The “structure of government relations, involving interactions between state and firms and state and 
labour” (Schmidt 2002: 107) is one of the key elements used by Schmidt in order to distinguish one type 
of capitalism from another. Whether those relations are at “arm’s length”, “negotiated” or “state-directed” 
(cf. Schmidt 2002: 107ff) essentially determines to which type of capitalism an economy belongs. The 
argument in the case of economic stimulus programs is that the type of relation between state, business 
and labor influences on the type of policy and the extensiveness of state support that is provided by the 
state. In other words, I argue that the higher the “proximity” and exchange of businesses and labor to the 
state, e.g. via lobby groups or trade-unions, the more the state is willing to design an extensive and sector- 
and/or labor-specific economic policy.  
The question following is what constitutes for “arm’s length”, “negotiated” or “state-directed” relations? 
Although Schmidt categorizes certain countries according to those aspects, she does not provide 
substantial empirical evidence for her claim that, for instance, government relations in Germany can be 
defined as “negotiated” (cf. Schmidt 2002: 113). However, I argue that the nature of government relations 
can also be determined based on the openness of the policy-formulation process of a country. If the 
institutional setting allows for an open policy-formulation process that includes “consultation with the 
people” (Schmidt 2006:34), business and labor supposedly have more impact when voicing their opinion. 
When the state has to listen to societal interest groups in its policy-formulation process, the relation 
between the state, business and labor should automatically be more intense. Therefore the concept of the 
openness of the policy-formulation process might be a good approach to capture the relation between the 
three groups of actors. 
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Hence, the next thing to ask is what factors constitute an “open” policy-formulation process. Though 
developed in a different context4, Vivien Schmidt’s work proves insightful again (cf. Schmidt 2006). In her 
book “Democracy in Europe. The EU and National Polities” (2006) Schmidt elaborates on the policy-
formulation process in different polity types (p.34ff). She distinguishes different forms of policy-
formulation processes according to polity types (ibid). According to Schmidt, the policy-making process in 
“compound polities” is – similarly to the policy-making process of the EU – more open to consultation 
with societal interest groups (ibid). Whereas in simple polities like France [or the UK] societal interest 
groups are normally “excluded” (ibid) from the policy-formulation process and only get to voice their 
opinion when it comes to implementation of policies, compound polities like the one of Germany have 
more “corporatist policymaking processes […] where certain privileged interests have traditionally been 
involved in policy formulation and implementation” (ibid: p.35).  
Now, in order to measure the influence of societal interest groups in the policy-making process, I will on 
the one hand look for the type of polity. The table below summarizes the relation between polity type and 
government relations. The argument reads as follows: a compound polity allows for greater influence of 
societal groups and therefore constitutes “negotiated” government relations. A simple polity, in contrast, 
works the other way round and allows for either one-way, i.e. state-directed, or arm’s length relations. On 
the other hand, I will analyze whether there is data that gives evidence of the involvement of interest 
groups in the process of drafting the stimulus packages. 
Table 1: Categorization of Polity Types based on the Relation between State, Business and Labor (source: own 
compilation based on Schmidt 2002 and Schmidt 2006) 
A more detailed account of the operationalization will be provided in section 4. 
2.3.3.1 IV1: Relation between State and Business 
The relation between the state and business, or in other words the “influence” business interest groups 
exert on the government in the policy-formulation process thus constitutes the first independent variable 
(IV1). Following the definition of the first variable, the first hypothesis reads as follows: 
H1: The higher the influence of (specific) business interest groups in the policy-formulation process, the higher the likelihood of 
a large-scale and sector-specific economic stimulus program. 
Intuitively, the problem of this choice of variable is precisely its operationalization. Whereas in some 
countries interest representation is quite organized, other countries feature quite informal exchange 
processes that are favored by a highly elite educational system, as it is the case in France5 (cf. Economist 
2012). 
2.3.3.2 IV2: Relation between State and Labor 
Likewise, the relation between state and labor as reflected in the “influence” of labor interest groups, i.e. 
trade-unions, in the policy-formulation process is defined as the second independent variable (IV2). 
Consequently, the second hypothesis can be read as: 
                                                 
4
 “The EU as Regional State“(Vivien Schmidt 2006). 
5 “Whereas an American CEO and novelist will never meet, the French political, business and cultural elites have 
practically fused” (Kuper 2013). 
Polity 
Type 
Involvement of Societal Interest Groups in 
the Policy Formulation Process 
Assumed Relation 
State – Business – Labor 
Simple Low Arm’s length/ State-directed 
Compound High Negotiated 
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H2: The higher the influence of labor-related interest groups in the policy-formulation process, the higher the likelihood of 
a large-scale, labor-supporting economic stimulus program. 
2.3.4 IV3: Relation Industry and Finance – Structure of the Financial System 
Another component that is considered as a distinguishing aspect of a type of capitalism in most of the 
relevant VoC-literature is the relation between industry and finance (cf. Hall/Soskice 2001: 7; Schmidt 
2002: 113; Amable 2002: 99ff/142ff). Most scholars who rely on this aspect argue that the type of 
financing that firms receive or seek for – whether equity-based financing via capital markets or debt 
financing through bank loans – depends on the type of capitalism (cf. Schmidt 2002: 113ff/119ff)6. In 
other words, the financial structure is highly correlated with the type of capitalism. To illustrate this, 
Germany – usually classified as a CME (cf. Hall/Soskice 2001: 20) or managed type of capitalism (cf. 
Schmidt 2002: 108) – has been traditionally quite dependent on bank financing (cf. Deutsche Bundesbank 
2012: 20ff). In the UK on the other hand – a classical example for a LME (cf. Hall/Soskice 2001: 19) or a 
market type of capitalism (cf. Schmidt 2002: 108) – companies rely much more on capital markets to raise 
capital (ibid). The rationale behind choosing the relation between industry and finance as an explanatory 
variable in this context is the assumption that in economies where firms rely more on bank financing than 
on capital markets, the need for a direct financial support for companies during the crisis was more 
pressing7. However, it should be highlighted that this assumption substantially differs from the implication 
Hall and Soskice state in the context of the financial structure of a company (cf. Hall/Soskice 2001: 
16/22f). They argue that firms in LMEs react faster to external shocks in terms of laying-off workers, etc. 
as they face greater pressures from capital markets “to sustain their profitability” (ibid.) Firms in CMEs on 
the other hand, they argue, are equipped with more “patient” capital and can therefore cope much better 
with a temporal loss of market share or profitability. The reason for why I diverge from this implication in 
the frame of this research is based on the fact that Hall and Soskice’s argument implicitly assumes that 
firms are sufficiently capitalized, i.e. have sufficient access to finance, to actually be “patient” and keep on 
providing firms with capital. As the data suggests, this was not the case in Europe during the crisis 
2008/09 which started as a banking crisis (cf. ECB 2008)8. Thus, it seems justified to diverge from the 
initial VoC-assumption.  
As many countries among the advanced economies suffered from a “credit crunch” as a result of the 
financial crisis, companies relying on bank financing were not able to refinance as easily as before the crisis 
because yields had gone up (cf. Ivashina/Scharfstein 2010: 319ff; Hassel/Lütz 2010: 260). Furthermore, 
due to the development from a financial crisis to an economic crisis, firms had trouble to repay their debts 
(cf. FTD 2009). Therefore, the link between the predominant form of financing in an economy and the 
amount and type of government support for firms seems worth examining and hence constitutes the third 
independent variable (IV3). Consequently, the related hypothesis can be defined as:  
                                                 
6 Amable argues similarly in saying that there is a basic distinction “between systems based on arm's-length finance, 
i.e. financial markets, and systems based on financial intermediaries—banks—which may have more or less 
long-term relationships with firms” (2003: 99). 
7 In their analysis of the national bank rescue packages Weber and Schmitz (2011) propose a hypothesis that argues 
in the opposite direction, i.e. that “LME’s have bigger bank rescue packages than CMEs” (p.647). However, their 
assumption is that “banks are sufficiently capitalized” (ibid) which was precisely not the case in the context of the 
financial crisis 2008. Also it should be added that in the regression analysis they performed the hypothesis got 
rejected (p. 659). Therefore the above stated approach seems worth examining. 
8 “The impact of banks’ funding costs and balance sheet constraints also contributed to the net tightening, 
particularly banks’ ability to access market financing” (ECB 2008: 1). 
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H3: The larger the share of firms relying on bank credit financing in an economy, the higher the likelihood of a 
large-scale and business-supporting stimulus program. 
In order to measure the degree of bank-dependent financing of an economy, I will analyze the credit to 
the non-financial sector in the countries during the period of 2008-2009 (cf. BIS 2013) in relation to GDP 
(cf. IMF 2013). 
2.4 Alternative Approaches 
Before testing the above formulated hypotheses on their validity, I will give an overview of some 
alternative approaches to the explanation of divergences of stimulus packages and consider why they are 
not fully capable of explaining the matter at hand. 
In their working paper, Saha and von Weizsäcker mention the puzzle of the great variation in size and 
composition of the different stimulus packages in the EU (cf. Saha/von Weizsäcker: 4). However, their 
attempt to explain those variations by “different starting conditions” seems a bit thin9, particularly since 
they do not account for the enormous variation in magnitude. Furthermore, the choice of “spending 
categories” (ibid) cannot be merely justified on the grounds of different starting conditions as can be seen 
in the example of Germany and France. In this example, the starting conditions give no indication on why 
the German government invested so much more in labor-market support-measures than France (cf. 
Saha/von Weizsäcker 2009:4). In both cases the costs associated with a large number of layoffs can be 
considered significant. Also, one could assume that in both countries firms would have an interest to keep 
their employees in order to avoid the cost of hiring new ones after the recession. This example underlines 
that a more comprehensive approach to this issue is necessary. 
Alternatively, Watt (2009) finds that high levels of government debt may have had a constraining effect on 
government policies during the crisis. This however, as he points out as well, should not be a decisive 
factor for governments when “running counter-cyclical policies” (ibid: 33). Assuming that policy-makers 
know that when employing Keynesian policies, the sources of funds should not influence the size and 
composition of the measures, this explanatory approach can be disregarded as a primary explanation for 
the puzzle observed. Yet, one should mention that “fiscal room for manoeuvre” (Weber/Schmitz 2011: 
642ff) had – according to Weber and Schmitz (2011) – a not insignificant effect on the size of the national 
bank rescue packages10. Nevertheless, the objectives of bank rescue packages and economic stimulus 
programs should be clearly distinguished. Since economic stimulus programs should have a substantial 
multiplying effect in terms of increasing GDP – in contrast to bank rescue packages that can be merely 
considered a loan to banks– budgetary constraints should not matter long-term. 
Another aspect that could potentially explain variations in the size of the stimulus packages is the differing 
degree of “openness” of an economy11 (cf. Katzenstein 1985: 24; Hassel/Lütz 2010: 261). This would 
certainly be a valid explanation if small and open economies had had significantly smaller – relative to 
their GDP – stimulus packages than large states. Yet, the data shows that Austria, Sweden and the 
Netherlands all had larger stimulus packages – relative to their GDP – than France (cf. Saha/von 
Weizsäcker 2009: 4, OECD 2009: 19).  
                                                 
9 “There may be countries where public infrastructure is acutely lacking so that investment projects enjoy widespread 
political support, whereas in others there are issues in the tax system that are waiting to be dealt with as part of a 
stimulus package” (Saha/von Weizsäcker 2009: 4). 
10 “There is evidence […] that tighter fiscal room for manoeuvre is associated with smaller bank rescue packages” 
(Weber/Schmitz 2011: 658). 
11 “Openness” in terms of foreign trade. 
 10 
Moving away from economic accounts, partisan theory (cf. Hibbs 1992), i.e. the party composition of the 
different governments, could also be an indicator for why the size and the composition of national 
stimulus packages differed so much. According to Manfred Schmidt (1995: 156) (economic) policies 
reflect the social constituencies of the parties forming the government. Hibbs (1992: 362) argues similarly 
when stating that economic policy should be “more expansionary […] under Left parties than Right 
ones”. When applied to the case of national stimulus packages, this would imply that the UK and Spain – 
since they had leftist parties in power during the crisis – would have had more extensive, explicitly labor-
supporting and more socially-oriented stimulus packages than Germany, France, the Netherlands or 
Denmark (cf. Bale/van Biezen 2009:862). However, this was not the case and many countries had 
conservative or liberal parties in power during the times of the crisis and still provided extensive stimulus 
programs. Thus, Partisan theory on its own cannot serve as an explanation for the variation on the 
dependent variable. I will, however, take into account the government composition when referring to 
Thelen’s power resource theory below (cf. Thelen 2012). 
3 Methodology, Data and Case Selection 
In the following I will briefly describe the methodological approach of this research, the data I am using 
and I will finally select the relevant cases for the comparative case study. 
3.1 Methodology 
Approaching the research question from the perspective of comparative political economy, theory has 
provided three distinct explanatory approaches. Since all three variables are part of the institutional 
framework applied here, it might be difficult to determine which of the independent variables is best 
capable of explaining the variation in size and composition of national economic stimulus packages. The 
institutional VoC-framework stipulates that the components of an institutional set up are complementary 
and interdependent instead of being able to separately explain policy outcomes. The method of controlled 
comparison that prescribes to compare values on the dependent variable of two or more cases with the 
values on the independent variable (cf. Van Evera 1997: 56ff) is hence difficult to apply here. Instead I will 
primarily rely on process-tracing (cf. ibid: 64) in order to assess to what extent each independent variable 
played a role in the policy-formulation process. This method seems particular suitable for the case of the 
economic stimulus programs, as most of them evolved over a time-span of several months (e.g. the 
German package, cf. BMWi 2010a) and process-tracing specifically “explores the chain of events or the 
decision-making process by which initial case conditions are translated into case outcomes” (Van Evera 
1997: 64). 
This method will then be applied in the context of a comparative case study of the stimulus programs of 
two different countries. The case study will be primarily assessed based on a qualitative content analysis. 
Given the complexities of the policy-making process and of the nature of the formulated explanatory 
variables this approach seems sensible. 
3.2 Data 
The data that the research is based on primarily stems from publicly accessible sources from either the 
countries themselves or from statistical outlets of international organizations such as the IMF, the ECB or 
the World Bank. Where necessary, the data is complemented by media sources. However, whenever 
possible, I use official data published by the respective governments since – in contrast to studies that 
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assess the effectiveness of stimulus programs – not the actual amount spent is relevant here, but the 
intended amounts and instruments of governments. 
3.3 Case Selection 
In order to select cases that yield the highest insights concerning the validity of the proposed explanatory 
factors, I will select cases based on their comparability. Since I want to focus on government interventions 
that were solely a response to the economic and financial crisis in 2008/2009, it seems sensible to limit the 
frame of potential cases to the OECD-member states. This is rational in order to ensure that only 
measures that were initiated in response to the crisis are taken into account in contrast to general 
economy-building measures that governments in developing countries might undertake. In a second step 
it makes sense to focus on Euro-zone countries since I am assessing fiscal- and not monetary-policies. In 
order to rule-out monetary-related distortions the Euro-zone appears as a useful filter. One should keep in 
mind that the above described research puzzle only constitutes a puzzle when the countries are more or 
less similar in economic terms, but also in terms of “crisis-affectedness . Although a comparison across 
different economies will always inherit some distortions, the effect of those distortions shall be limited by 
comparing stimulus packages of economies that exhibit roughly the same characteristics. These 
requirements and the objective to keep the complexity at a manageable level limit the number of potential 
cases greatly, but they should also increase the validity of the findings. The following table therefore lists 
the five largest economies of the Euro-zone in 2008/09. The GDP per capita indicator shall reflect a 
general comparability in terms of “economic wealth” in order to rule-out the above mentioned crisis-
unrelated measures. The indicators “Average projected growth of GDP” and “(Net) debt in % of GDP” 
are used to ensure that the selected countries are affected by the crisis to roughly the same extent.  
 
Table  2: Five largest Euro-zone Economies (Source: Own compilation (based on IMF 2013, OECD 2009, 
Gouvernement.fr 2010) 
* average (mean) of 2008 and 2009 
 
Based on the rationale of comparability, Germany and France seem like the most suitable candidates for 
an analysis of their economic stimulus programs in the frame of a comparative case study12. On the one 
hand their economic preconditions seem most similar – GDP per capita was almost the same in 2008/09. 
                                                 
12 Please note that the total amount of stimulus packages may differ depending on the source I refer to (e.g. compare 
BMWi 2009, OECD 2009, Saha/von Weizsäcker 2009).  





(Net) Debt in 
% of GDP* 
AV: Size of Stimulus 
(total/in proportion 
to GDP) 
France 28,426 -1.61% 67.15% 38.8 bn €/ ~2.2% 
Germany 28,584 -2.14% 53.41% 108 bn € /~4.61% 
Italy 23,984 -3.33% 92.98% 0 € 
Netherlands 33,438 -0.93% 21.70% 13.4 bn €/ ~ 2.4% 
Spain 23,328 -1.42% 36.65% 56.8 bn €/ ~ 5.3% 
 12 
Moreover, they appear to have been affected similarly by the crisis. On the other hand, the variation in 
magnitude of the stimulus programs seems to be largest. What has not yet been analyzed though is the 
variation in composition. Thus, before France and Germany are finally selected as candidates for the 
comparative case study, I will briefly compare the choice of instruments and compositions of the stimulus 
packages of the two countries13. Although one should not select cases solely based on the DV, extreme 
values on the DV can certainly be a factor for case selection (cf. Van Evera1997: 77). 
The two charts below depict precisely that the French and the German stimulus programs did not only 
differ substantially in magnitude, but also in composition. Whereas almost one third of the French 
package went to direct support of businesses, the German program has – counter intuitively – a much 
larger social component. Around 40% of the German program went into employee and unemployed 
support programs. 
Since a much more detailed analysis of both programs will follow below, I will leave it with this broad 
comparison and conclude that as regards counter-cyclical stimulus programs in the aftermath of the crisis, 
France and Germany are suitable cases for a comparative case study. 
 
 
Figure 1: Breakdown of the French Stimulus Program (source: own compilation based on: Bilan du Plan de Relance, 
Gouvernement.fr 2010) 
                                                 






French Stimulus Program 
 (Total: 38.8 bn €) 
Tax measures for companies
Public Investment Program
Financing and Consumer Spending
Support (includes car scrappage bonus)





Figure 2: Breakdown of the German Stimulus Program (source: own compilation based on BMWi 2010a) 
4 Empirics: National Economic Stimulus Programs in Times of Crisis 
Each stimulus program will be assessed based on the above identified independent variables. Where each 
program contains of a multitude of measures, I will focus on an analysis of the largest and most striking 
areas of each program. 
4.1 General Overview: the Economic Stimulus Programs in Germany and 
France 
Before deep-diving into the analysis of the two stimulus programs, there are several aspects that should be 
pointed out first. First of all, the numbers referred to in different publications dealing with the stimulus 
programs differ substantially (e.g. Saha/von Weizsäcker 2009, OECD 2009, Watt 2009)14. In the 
following, I will therefore rely foremost on primary sources published by the respective governments in 
order to limit distortions. Whenever I have to refer to secondary sources concerning the content and 
amounts of the stimulus programs, I will indicate so. Secondly, there is a slight temporal difference with 
which the countries were hit by the crisis. As can be seen in table 1 above, France was initially not as badly 
affected by the crisis as the much more export-oriented German economy (cf. IMF 2013). This is also 
reflected in the way the respective governments handled the crisis. Germany reacted much faster in terms 
of initiating economic stimulus packages, which were enacted in November 2008 and January 2009 
(BMWi 2010a), whereas the bulk of France’s program was drafted in February 2009 (Gouvernement.fr 
2010). Equally important is the decision by the European Council in 2008 to inject 200 billion € (≈1.5% 
of GDP) in the European economy to counter the effects of the crisis (cf. EC 2008: 6). The bulk of this 
injection – 170 billion € – was intended to be covered by the individual Member States. The EU strongly 
urged Member States to act. Yet, the precise implications of this indication – i.e. which Member State 
would contribute what amount – were left rather vague (cf. Saha/von Weizsäcker 2009: 2). 
Finally, the different political situations in the two countries should be pointed out. Whereas Germany 
was in the very peculiar situation of having a grand coalition of CDU and SPD in government that was 
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Automotive Industry Support Measures
Others
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facing an upcoming election, France was supposedly characterized by less political dynamics at that time. 
The potential impact of those political dynamics should be kept in mind when evaluating the economic 
policies of the two countries. 
4.3.2 The German Economic Stimulus Program 
The German Economic Stimulus Program chronologically consisted of four parts (cf. BMWi 2010a)15. As 
most other governments of advanced economies, the German government first reacted with rescue 
packages for banks in order to counter the most severe and pressing effects of the financial crisis (cf. Illing 
2013: 35ff). In a next step the government issued a “release-package” (“Entlastungspaket”) in October 
2008 that was primarily composed of measures that supported consumers and employees (cf. BMWi 
2010a). About a month later the first economic stimulus package was released (“Konjunkturpaket I”), 
which had a much larger business-supporting share. In fact, apart from extending the length of 
entitlement for the short-term allowance (“Kurzarbeitergeld”)16, this package was solely comprised of 
business-supporting measures, considering that some indirect measures – for instance the accelerated 
implementation of transport-related infrastructure-investments of 2 bn € (ibid) – can in fact be regarded as 
supporting measures for the construction sector. In contrast, the following package (“Konjunkturpaket 
II”) was much more balanced with about half of the measures aimed at family and employee-relieving 
support. This second package made up 51% of all stimulus measures combined. The large social 
component of the package – particularly in comparison to the French stimulus program – seems 
particularly remarkable and shall be assessed in the following in greater detail from the perspectives of the 
different independent variables. The Growth Acceleration Law (“Wachstumsbeschleunigungsgesetz”) 
from November 2010 was again primarily made up of family support measures with an increase of child 
benefits representing more than 70% of the package (ibid). Apart from the large social component and the 
investments in infrastructure, which heavily supported the construction-industry, the significant support 
of the automotive industry is striking and worth examining in more detail. Below, a detailed overview of 
the different measures of each (sectoral) program is depicted. 
  
                                                 
15 Please refer to the official overview published by the BMWi shown in the annex (section 6) of this paper. 
16 Prolonging the length of entitlement for the short-term allowance is not even part of the 100 bn € of the German 
stimulus package since according to the German government “Finanzielle Auswirkungen lassen sich nicht 
quantifizieren, da auch ohne Verlängerung der Bezugsdauer eine Inanspruchnahme von Kurzarbeitergeld erfolgt 
wäre” (BMWi 2010a). 
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Figure 3: Overview of Employee and Unemployed Support Measures (source: own compilation based on BMWi 2010a) 
  
Figure 4: Overview of Investment Measures (source: own compilation based on BMWi 2010a) 
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Figure 6: Overview of SME Support Measures (source: own compilation based on BMWi 2010a)17 
 
 
Figure 7: Overview of Automotive Industry Support Measures (source: own compilation based on BMWI 2010a) 
4.1.2 The French Economic Stimulus Program 
Official information on behalf of the French government about the exact composition of the French 
stimulus program (“Plan de Relance”) is regrettably not as detailed as information published by the 
BMWi18 (cf. Plan de relance, Gouvernement.fr 2010). Consequently, I also have to rely on secondary 
resources. As indicated above, the most striking difference to the German program is its major focus on 
business support through (temporary) tax cuts, direct financial support and consumer spending incentives, 
e.g. the car scrappage bonus (“prime de la casse”), on the one hand and the, comparatively, low share of 
social aid on the other (cf. Gouvernement.fr 2010). Given the rather consumer-focused nature of former 
French stimulus programs (cf. Bennhold 2008a) this appears puzzling. However, the part of the program 
that was specifically directed towards families, workers and unemployed particularly targeted the lowest 
                                                 
17 The 1 bn € labeled as “Credit and guarantee Program” were provided additionally to the “Wirtschaftsfond 
Deutschland”. Although not officially part of the stimulus program, the “Wirtschaftsfond” was initiated in response 
to it in March 2009 (cf. BMWI 2010b). The entire “Wirtschaftsfond Deutschland” was comprised of 11.5 bn € of 
financial aid and guarantees (ibid). 
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income groups by providing housing and renovation benefits as well as tax cuts (cf. Gouvernement.fr 
2010). In terms of specific sectoral support, the support of public enterprises which in turn invested 
heavily in infrastructure in 2009/10 (= 3.9 bn €) (ibid)19 should be mentioned on the one hand. On the 
other, in line with Germany’s measures, France also provided special support to the automotive industry 
with a car scrappage scheme. However, the bonus for consumers was significantly lower: In contrast to 
the 2,500 € incentive for German consumers, the French government at first only provided 500 € and 
then 1,000 €, in return for consumers having their more than ten year old car scrapped and buy a new one 
(cf. Handelsblatt 2009a; Bennhold 2008a). In both countries the bonus was officially a subsidy for the 
acquisition of new, environment-friendly cars.  
4.2 Analysis of IV1 and IV2: Interest Mediation in Germany and France 
As already mentioned, whether societal interest groups can exert influence on the policy-making process 
or not largely depends on the specific policy-formulation process of a state (cf. Schmidt 2006: 25ff). 
Therefore, when considering the compound polity of Germany (cf. Schmidt 2006: 35), it comes as no 
surprise that its model of interest mediation has been widely described as “corporatist” (ibid) where 
business, politics and labor have traditionally been able to find compromises and solutions that were 
mutually beneficial (cf. Weßels 2007: 84). Another aspect that should be analyzed when assessing the 
degree of influence exertion by lobby groups in an economy is the structure and organization of lobby 
groups, particularly with respect to their centralization (cf. ibid: 86). The size of the interest group 
landscape of a state generally varies with the size of the economy. This, however, does not give any 
implications about the political importance of interest groups in a state (cf ibid: 87). German associations 
– whether business or labor groups – are traditionally regarded as “quite concentrated and centralized” 
(ibid: 91), particularly with respect to trade-unions, employer associations and farmer associations (ibid). 
Closely related is the level of centralization of the wage-bargaining process (cf. Schmidt 2002: 113ff; 
Weßels 2007: 97f). Corporatist economies are often characterized by highly centralized trade-unions and 
wage-bargaining processes (ibid). According to Weßels (2007: 98), there is a “clear correlation between 
organizational-structural centralization and the centralization of wage-bargaining negotiations”. In contrast 
to Germany, the French system is characterized by highly fragmented arrangements preventing a political 
exchange from developing in which business or labor groups can voice their opinion in an organized 
manner (ibid). 
Hence, in order to evaluate the degree of influence of interest groups in the policy-formulation processes 
with regard to the national stimulus programs of Germany and France, two dimensions will be compared 
and evaluated against the backdrop of the polity types of the two countries. On the one hand, the 
organizational concentration of the relevant interest groups constitutes one dimension (cf. Weßels 2007: 
92ff). On the other hand, the official position of the relevant groups regarding government interventions 
in response to the crisis represents the second dimension. These factors, combined with the general 
possibility of interest exertion in a system as reflected in the classification of the polity type shall constitute 
an attempt to capture the influence of societal interest groups in the policy-formulation process. Finally, 
the political constellation in the two countries – that may favor certain political groups over others 
according to the power resource theory (Thelen 2012: 148) – will also be taken into account. 
                                                 
19 E.g. SNCF, La Poste, GDF Suez, EDF, RATP (cf. Gouvernement.fr 2010). 
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4.2.1 IV1 Germany: Large Influence by Automotive and Construction Industry  
When assessing the German stimulus program with regard to the influence of business interest groups vis-
à-vis German policy-makers, the position of four particular groups should be analyzed with greater detail, 
namely the Federation of German Industries (BDI), the German Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(DIHK), the German Association of the Automotive Industry (VDA) and the Central Association of the 
German Construction Industry (“Zentralverband Deutsches Baugewerbe”). Whereas the BDI, as the 
umbrella organization for the German industry, and the DIHK represent the general interest of the 
German industry, the latter two organizations act on behalf of specific industries that were 
disproportionately favored by the German stimulus program.  
As mentioned above, particularly the first stimulus package was quite business-oriented in its composition 
reflecting the publicly expressed preferences of the BDI (cf. Deutschlandfunk 2009). Also retrospectively, 
SMEs seemed to be generally satisfied with the measures the German government (cf. BDI 2009). In 
contrast, the DIHK at first rejected the idea of an economic stimulus program, warning of the high level 
of public debt and the competitive distortions a stimulus program would cause (cf. DIHK 2008; Berliner 
Morgenpost 2008). The president of the DIHK particularly criticized the lack of a clear focus of the 
program (cf. Reuters 2009). Hence, the positions of the supposedly two most influential, industry-wide 
interest groups in Germany were diametrically opposed towards the end of 2008. The stimulus program 
put into place by the German government would thus suggest two explanations: Either the opinions 
voiced by the two associations had no impact on the design of the stimulus program or the BDI was more 
influential. An indicator for the latter is the speech chancellor Merkel held at a BDI event in January 2013 
(cf. Bundesregierung 2013) in which she emphasized the close collaboration between BDI and the 
government during the crisis20.  
Another powerful example for the close linkage of industry and government in the management of the 
crisis is the composition of a steering counsel for company financing within the BMWi 
(“Lenkungsausschuss Unternehmensfinanzierung”; BMWi 2009). This steering counsel invoked by the 
former Minister Guttenberg was assigned to work out recommendations on behalf of the 
“Wirtschaftsfond Deutschland”. More precisely, it should evaluate which companies were suitable to 
receive financial support by the fund (ibid). Interestingly enough, more than half of the “experts” who 
were part of that counsel were former or still active members of the German industry21.  Considering 
those few, but highly relevant examples that underline the close collaboration between the German 
industry and the government, and considering the more than 10 billion € of “general” SME-support as 
part of the German economic stimulus program, the first hypothesis seems to yield some validity. 
Nevertheless, considering the dimension of the level of organization and centralization, the BDI does in 
fact not exhibit the characteristics of an organization that favors collective action (cf. Alt/Gilligan 2000: 
336ff). Since the members of the BDI are so diverse – as it is an umbrella-organization of several 
industrial lobby groups – the benefits of strong economic stimulus are quite sparse.  
However, before jumping to any conclusions, the specific measures aimed at the construction and 
automotive sector and their sources should be examined as well. Although the effects of the car scrappage 
                                                 
20 „Wir haben damals mit den Sozialpartnern, mit dem BDI und vielen anderen oft zusammengesessen und haben 
gemeinsam in dem Geist gehandelt, dass die deutsche Wirtschaft, und insbesondere auch die deutsche Industrie, die 
Grundlagen unseres Wohlstands legt und dass die in den Unternehmen Beschäftigten das sind, was den Schatz 
unserer Bundesrepublik Deutschland ausmacht. Es gab eine große Gemeinsamkeit von Sozialpartnern, von BDI, 
von Politik. So erwuchs aus dem Bangen um Betriebe und Arbeitsplätze die Möglichkeit, in einer schwierigen Zeit 
eine Brücke zu bauen.“ (Angela Merkel, Bundesregierung 2013). 
21 E.g. Jürgen Heraus, Dr. Hubertus Erlen, Dr. Michael Rogowski or Nikolaus Knauf. (BMWI 2009a). 
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program have been assessed quite differently throughout Germany (cf. ZeitOnline 2009; Handelsblatt 
2009a), the intended beneficiaries were clearly the German automotive industry and its employees. The 
measure evidently met a key request of Germany’s arguably most influential lobby group, the VDA (cf. 
Mrusek 2009). In an interview with the FAZ (ibid) that took place about a month before the introduction 
of the second stimulus program that contained the car scrappage program, the president of the VDA 
called for an environment allowance for people who replace their old car with a new, more energy 
efficient one, i.e. a car scrappage program. With revenues that make up of almost 15% of the German 
GDP (cf. vda.de; IMF 2013) and with all major automotive producers as members of the VDA, the direct 
implementation of measures following requests by the group’s president comes as no surprise. In contrast 
to the BDI, the composition and structure of the VDA exhibits features that are very favorable to 
collective action, with a high concentration of powerful corporations (cf. vda.de) that broadly favor the 
same policies22 (cf. Alt/Gilligan 2000: 336ff). This also explains the disproportional large amount of 
measures specifically aimed at the automotive industry (6.3 bn €) in comparison to the 10.8 bn € aimed at 
supporting SME’s and the industry in general.  
Although investments in infrastructure – whether they relate to transportation, the public education 
system, hospitals or other public facilities – usually come with positive externalities for the entire society, 
the most direct beneficiaries are companies assigned with state-financed infrastructure projects (cf. 
BMVBS 2009; Handelsblatt 2009c; DIW 2009). According to Weßels (2007: 95), the interest-groups of the 
German construction-industry feature a disproportionately high degree of concentration in comparison 
with other EU-Member States’ groups, which is a good indicator for the effectiveness of the influence this 
industry group can exert on the German government. Considering that the construction sector only makes 
up around 4% of the German gross value added (cf. zdb.de), the high concentration seems to be a 
particularly powerful characteristic. The particular focus of the stimulus program on the construction 
industry substantiates this argument: Around 7.7 bn € were targeted directly at the construction sector via 
tax deductibility of handcrafter services, support of CO2-friendly building modernization and investments 
in infrastructure (cf. BMWi 2010a). These measures highly correlated with the policies requested by the 
ZDB when calling for a second stimulus package (cf. ZDB 2009). Considering the even smaller gross 
value added by the construction sector in Germany compared to the automotive industry, this is 
remarkable and may be another indicator for the large influence of the construction sector. 
Based on these examples, one can infer that there is a strong indication that the first variable (IV1) yields 
some explanatory power. However, in order to further validate this conclusion a comparison with the 
French stimulus program has to be performed. 
4.2.2 IV1 France: Limited Influence Due to Nature of Policy Formulation Process, 
but Possibility for Informal Influence  
“For France, open interest consultation offends ideas prevalent since the Revolution that see it as 
illegitimate” (Schmidt 2006: 35). Given the lack of formal opportunities for (business) interest groups to 
exert influence, the large share of business supporting measures in France appears particularly remarkable. 
Another aspect that adds to this peculiarity is the fact that former French governments used to 
concentrate on customer-focused instead of company-focused measures when installing stimulus packages 
in the past (cf. Bennhold 2008a). Yet, although interest groups formally have no right to be consulted in 
                                                 
22 Yet, one should keep in mind that some automobile producers benefitted more from the car scrappage program in 
Germany than others as the environment allowance of 2,500 € favored small cars over larger ones (cf. Handelsblatt 
2009b). 
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the policy making process (cf. Schmidt 2006: 35) this does not mean that, particularly business, interest 
groups cannot pressure political decision-makers informally. This “informal” consultation process 
between the political and business elite is strongly tied to the specifics of the French educational system 
(cf. Kuper 2013; Economist 2012). Only few positions in the higher administration and on the boards of 
French CAC 40-companies are occupied by non-grande école or – even more narrowly – non-ENA 
graduates. Since there are only very few universities that the administration and the top-companies recruit 
from, the French elite is a very small, homogenous group whose members usually know each other in one 
way or another (ibid). Thus, no matter what the official policy-making process looks like, it can be 
assumed that businesses will have some sort of influence on the policy-outcome due to personal relations. 
This, in contrast, might also explain why business interest groups had more influence on the French 
stimulus program than labor groups. Whereas the “French political, business and cultural elites have 
practically fused” (ibid) due to their common alma mater(s) and friends, representatives of labor groups in 
France are less likely to be from the same circles as business and administrative executives23.The large 
share of investments particularly in public enterprises supports the argument that business interests are 
informally transmitted to policy-makers in France (cf. OECD 2009). Among the CEOs of the five major 
public enterprises that received benefits in 2009 – EDF, GDF Suez, La Poste, SNCF and RATP (cf. 
Gouvernement.fr 2010) – , there is no single one that did not attend ENA or École de Polytechnique, the 
two most prestigious universities in France (cf. Kuper 2013). But as I elaborate below, the investment in 
public enterprises may also reflect the stronger influence of public sector trade-unions in comparison with 
private sector trade-unions. 
To sum up, although French business interest groups have no formal right of consultation in the policy-
formulation process, it can be assumed that through informal channels they can still exert significant 
influence on policy-makers. This may be an explanation for the business-focus of the French stimulus 
program. Therefore, it is also of less interest how industry-groups are organized which is why this aspect is 
not further analyzed here24. However, this explanation does not capture why former stimulus programs 
had such a consumer-focus whereas this was more company-oriented. Following the string of arguments 
above, one could explain the company-focus with Sarkozy’s strong ties with the business world (cf. 
Pinçon/Pinçon-Charlot 2010). Although being the first French president without an ENA-education, 
Sarkozy is said to have a strong network of connections in the business world (ibid). Along with the 
relative ineffectiveness of previous consumer-focused stimulus packages (cf. Bennhold 2008a) and with 
the informal mechanisms of influence-exertions of business interest groups, this is likely to have caused 
the paradigm-shift in French economic policy. Applying the arguments of Thelen’s power-resource theory 
(cf. Thelen 2012: 148f) to business- instead of to labor-interest groups, one could also argue that with 
Sarkozy as president, businesses had a strong “political ally” in the Elysée-palace during the crisis and 
therefore benefitted more than labor-groups.  
The findings in this section thus further validate the first hypothesis that the higher the influence of 
business interest groups in the policy-formulation process, the higher the likelihood of a large-scale and 
sector-specific economic stimulus package. According to this logic, the overall smaller stimulus program 
of France might then be explained by the limited influence of business interest groups due to the nature of 
the French policy-making process. 
                                                 
23 Compare CVs of trade-unions’ presidents. 
24 One should, however, mention that the largest French employer-association, MEDEF, criticized the French 
stimulus package for being not sufficient in order to counter the recession (cf. Le Figaro 2009). 
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4.3 IV2 Germany: Labor Groups Still Benefit From Corporatist Traditions  
Close collaboration between government, labor and industry has long been a key feature of the German 
economy and one of the most mentioned arguments for why the German model can be classified as a 
CME (cf. Hall/Soskice 2001: 24ff; Schmidt 2002: 114). Typically, the state acts as a “bystander” in labor-
regulations (Schmidt 2002:113) in Germany since labor and businesses have autonomy in collective 
bargaining (cf. Deutscher Bundestag: Grundgesetz Art.9, Abs.3). Therefore, when designing a stimulus 
program, the state is more inclined to consult business and labor groups to “enable” (Schmidt 2002:113) 
both parties in order to reach a mutually beneficial agreement. Since the German industry model is based 
on the employment of a “highly skilled labor force” (Hall/Soskice 2001: 24), firms have an incentive for 
retaining long-term employment relations with their workforce in order to keep their workers’ knowledge 
within the firm and to benefit from their learning curve. Hence, the short-term labor allowance that was 
significantly expanded during the crisis (cf. BMWi 2009) can be regarded as a non-purely labor-supporting 
measure, but one that precisely depicts a situation that is “mutually-beneficial” to labor and business (cf. 
Economist 2013). Here, the state acts in its as by Schmidt described role as an “enabling facilitator” 
(p.113). In contrast to state-enhanced economies, the state does not directly intervene in labor-relations by 
imposing regulations on businesses, but supports firms and workers indirectly by providing incentives to 
cooperate. According to the German Federal Labor Market Authority (cf. Bundesagentur für Arbeit 
2009:11f) the demand for the short-time labor allowance increased significantly during the crisis with 
700,000 workers receiving short-time allowances in February 2009. The decline of short-time allowance 
receivers down to 89,400 in October of the same year and the overall stability of the German labor market 
during the crisis (ibid) underline that the setting of incentives that left autonomy with businesses worked 
quite well in the cooperative model of Germany. As the Federal Labor Market Authority points out in its 
report of 2009, businesses have to ask themselves what is more costly for them “making skilled workers 
redundant or recruiting them after the crisis” (ibid: 15). This calculation certainly highly depends on the 
prevailing labor-market regulations. In Germany – at least over a certain period of time – the regulation 
favors retaining workers over lay-offs. Subsequently, one can conclude that the structure of government-
labor relations together with the specific emphasis on skilled labor that characterizes the structure of the 
German industry, has led to an extensive labor-specific share within the German stimulus program. 
Apart from a general analysis of the state-labor relations, the organization and concentration of trade-
unions in Germany shall be examined as well as the demands of the most relevant labor groups in 
Germany. According to Weßels (2007: 97f), the level of organizational concentration of labor groups and 
the centralization of the bargaining process vary with the type of capitalism. He shows empirically that in 
CMEs like Germany those two dimensions correlate positively and are quite high. This leads to an 
exchange of interests and ideas rather than an imposition of rules by the state. Although many scientists 
claim that the power of large, industry-encompassing trade-unions is declining in Germany with small, 
industry-specific trade-unions becoming more effective, e.g. the train drivers’ trade-union, and the large 
ones losing more and more members (cf. Eurofound 2011), the German trade-unions can still be regarded 
as being among the most powerful and best organized in Europe (cf. Weßels 2007: 97). The confederation 
of German Trade-Unions (DGB) comprises trade-unions from all major industries (cf. DGB.de) thereby 
carrying significant weight in government and wage negotiations. Though not directly involved in 
collective bargaining, DGB represents the interests of its members vis-à-vis politicians and the general 
public (cf. DGB.de).  
Examining the role of the DGB in the context of designing stimulus programs, it is quite remarkable that 
it claims that the trade-union for the metal industry (IG Metall, member of the DGB) considers itself the 
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inventor of the German car scrappage program (cf. DGB 2009: 6). At the same time, this underlines once 
again that the German government primarily adopted measures that were mutually beneficial – for labor 
and for businesses. Further, the DGB holds to itself to being the first interest group in Europe that 
demanded a governmental economic stimulus program at all (ibid: 8). The document by the DGB also 
underlines that not only business representatives were part of governmental expert groups, but also trade-
union representatives who participated as experts in public hearings concerning the bank rescue package 
in the Bundestag (ibid). When comparing demands by business groups with demands from the DGB, it 
seems as if the German government particularly implemented those measures that had the highest subset 
of interests, i.e. the car scrappage scheme, the short-time labor allowance, investments in infrastructure, 
etc. This reflects to what extent corporatist structures still have significant influence on the policy-output 
in Germany. From that perspective, it is not surprising that the German government employed much less 
tax cuts for companies as a measure to stimulate the economy as the French government did intensely (i.e. 
32% of the entire stimulus, cf. Gouvernement.fr 2010), since business tax cuts are primarily designed to 
help businesses, but have little (in)direct impact on workers. Hence, the findings in this section seem to 
confirm the validity of the second hypothesis (H2). 
4.4 IV2 France: High Levels of Fragmentation in Labor-Relations Leaves 
Labor Groups with Little or no Influence 
As mentioned above, given the high unemployment rate in France compared to the one in Germany at 
the time (cf. Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2009:14), the small share of labor support seems particularly 
puzzling. It appears as if the cause of this “economic mismatch” might again be found in the institutional 
configuration of the French economy. Therefore an analysis of the French government-labor relations 
should shed some light on this issue. 
Apart from the comparative disadvantage labor-groups face in terms of influence exertion due to the 
nature of the French policy-making process and the structure of the educational system, the French labor 
movement is considered one of the most fragmented and weakest in the EU (cf. Weßels 2007: 98; 
Bennhold 2008b). This is also reflected in the large number of “general” trade-unions that exist in France 
– in contrast to the strong, sector-specific unions in Germany that are organized under the umbrella-
organization of the DGB (cf. Thelen 2012: 144; DGB.de) – and the paradoxically low participation rates 
(cf. Eurofound 2013). Weßels argues that due to those heavily fragmented labor-relations arrangements, a 
process of political exchange, “that is constituted by inclusion, exclusion and reciprocal reference”25 
(Weßels 2007: 98), does not take place in France. It seems as if the weakness of French labor-unions even 
increased throughout the crisis as their supposedly most powerful bargaining instrument – “faire la grève” 
(to strike) – lost some of its force vis-à-vis employers (“Striking is hardly a threat when management 
doesn’t want you to work”) (cf. Bennhold 2008b).  
When comparing the structure of the French trade-union landscape with its German counterpart, the 
structural weakness of French unions is immediately visible. French unions organize less than 10% of all 
employees (cf. Ebbinghaus 2002:477; Bennhold 2008b), which makes them the “least organized in 
Europe” (ibid.). Moreover, unions are deeply divided in two camps with the more moderate unions that 
seek agreement with employers on a reform of the industrial relations on the one hand, and more radical 
unions that oppose reform on the other (ibid). This organizational weakness can be translated into a lower 
weight of workers’ voice in the political decision-making process.  
                                                 
25 Quotation translated by the author, original quotation in German. 
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The only sector that is well-organized in terms of trade-unions’ power is the public sector; membership 
here is three times larger than in the private sector (cf. Bennhold 2008b). Considering the large share of 
measures supporting public enterprises within the French stimulus program (cf. Gouvernement.fr 2010), 
the stronger organization of public sector trade unions seems to be reflected in stronger influence in the 
policy-formulation process.  
To summarize, French private sector unions seem to face three major disadvantages vis-à-vis their German 
counterparts. First, they lack the right to be formally involved in the policy-formulation process. Secondly, 
they feature structural and organizational weaknesses. Thirdly, they do not have the opportunity to exert 
influence on the government informally as French business groups supposedly have due to the 
educational system in France. 
Thus, the findings in this section provide even more evidence that the above formulated hypothesis can 
be supported: the more an institutional framework allows labor-groups’ influence in the policy-
formulation process, the more employee-focused and socially-oriented the stimulus program (and vice 
versa). 
4.5 IV3: Comparison Germany and France – More Commonalities than 
Differences in the Financial Structures 
In order to determine to what extent the financial structure of the two selected economies had an 
influence on the composition and magnitude of the stimulus programs, it seems sensible to compare the 
two cases directly. 
In Germany, the industry-finance relations have traditionally been considered “close” (Schmidt 2002: 114) 
and the financial structure of the German economy has been characterized by a strong dependence on 
bank financing (ibid) – also called the Hausbanken system (ibid: 122). This preference for bank financing 
over capital markets has given banks significant control over German companies and it is said that this has 
caused firms to take a more long-term view on business activities (ibid; Deutsche Bundesbank 2012: 23). 
When the financial crisis hit Europe, it directly caused a significant tightening of credit standards for large 
enterprises and SMEs according to the ECB (ECB 2008: 9ff). Also firms reported that their access to 
money markets and debt securities markets was hampered due the financial market turmoil (ibid). Against 
the backdrop of the described institutional setting, one would assume that a highly bank dependent 
economy would be hit much more severely by a banking crisis in contrast to more capital market oriented 
economies as the credit crunch would lead to liquidity problems for the local firms. Following this string 
of arguments, it seems logical that the German stimulus program contained more direct financial support 
for businesses than the French program. As mentioned in footnote 17, although only partly included in 
the official stimulus program, the “Wirtschaftsfond Deutschland” (cf. BMWi 2010b) was comprised of 
11.5 bn € of direct financial aid and guarantees – a substantial amount compared to the less than 5 bn € of 
financial support from the French government (cf. Gouvernement.fr 2010). French firms, on the other 
hand, are usually described as being much more capital market oriented than their German counterparts 
(cf. Schmidt 2003: 537f).  In other words, the French stimulus program was smaller and contained less 
direct financial aid for businesses as the need for such aid was arguably lower.  
However, when trying to track this hypothesis empirically, one does not get a clear picture that supports 
this claim. According to the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), total credit to non-financial 
institutions has not been substantially larger – relative to GDP – in Germany than in France during the 






























in % of GDP 
(2009) 
Germany 2,636 2,710 2,405 2,283 110 119 
France 1,939 1,949 1,799 1,743 108 112 
Table 3: Credit to Non-Financial Private Sector in Germany and France Relative to GDP in 2008/09 (Source: own 
compilation based on BIS 2013 and IMF 2013) 
 
Also the German Federal Reserve (Deutsche Bundesbank 2012: 23f) observed that the bank dependence 
in Germany has been significantly reduced in recent years. Instead, large firms rely much more on internal 
financing nowadays (ibid). When additionally comparing the interest rates for non-financial institutions in 
the two countries at that time, which did not develop significantly differently during the crisis (cf. ECB 
2009b)26, one would have to reason that French companies must have been equally affected by the credit 
crunch. Another argument would be that Germany’s Mittelstand has more SMEs than France and – as 
“SMEs largely rely on banks when selecting sources of external financing” (ECB 2009a: 4) – the German 
economy would be much more dependent on banks than on capital markets. However, the claim that 
Germany has more SMEs than France due to its strong Mittelstand is not reflected in the empirical data (cf. 
EC 2012). Hence, even though market capitalization is still significantly higher in France than in Germany 
(cf. World Bank 2007-2009)27;28, the difference between Germany as a managed type of capitalism and 
France as a state-enhanced type does not seem that significant. This can also be seen in Schmidt’s analysis 
(cf. Schmidt 2002; Schmidt 2003) in which she primarily contrasts France and Germany with Britain. In 
other words, the financial structure is certainly a distinguishing element when distinguishing LMEs from 
CMEs, but when it comes to market capitalism versus state-enhanced capitalism this aspect seems to have 
only limited viability in explaining differential policy outcomes. 
Against the backdrop of the seemingly similar financial structure of Germany and France, the large 
differences in the German and French stimulus programs with regard to direct financial support appear 
even more puzzling. According to the above presented data, the need for financial aid must have been as 
pressing in France as in Germany. Hence, the third variable can be dismissed as an explanatory factor in 
the analysis of the stimulus programs. A comparison of financial structure seems to yield more insights 
when comparing the bank rescue packages (cf. Weber/Schmitz 2011) or when comparing LMEs with 
CMEs. 
4.6 Summary of Results – Validity of Independent Variables 
The analysis of the two stimulus programs of Germany and France showed that the differences in 
magnitude cannot be explained without an in-depth analysis of the different components of the programs. 
                                                 
26 Although interest rates in France dropped by a larger amount than in Germany, the data indicates no significant 
difference. In both cases the loose monetary-policy of the ECB had a significant effect on interest rates (cf. ECB 
2009b). 
27 According to World Bank data the average market capitalization of listed companies in the years 2008-2009 was 64 
% of GDP in France and 35 % of GDP in Germany (cf. World Bank 2007-2009).  
28 Market capitalization is a proxy used by Vivien Schmidt to determine the “differential impact of financial markets” 
(Schmidt 2002: 119ff). 
 25 
With the help of an analysis of the three independent variables the sources of the variance in the stimulus 
programs of France and Germany have become visible. There are three key findings that stand out in the 
assessment of the stimulus programs: 
1 In Germany, corporatist traditions still heavily influence policy-outcomes. 
2 In France, the institutional setting limits the power of labor-groups profoundly and the 
educational system seems to disproportionately favor business-interest groups in the 
exertion of influence in policy-making processes. 
3 Finance-industry relations are less useful in distinguishing managed economies from 
state-enhanced economies.  
Regarding the relation between business and state as a cause for larger and more business-oriented 
stimulus packages, I have presented evidence that supports the validity of this hypothesis (H1). In terms of 
the size of the stimulus package, it comes as no surprise that the German stimulus package was more 
comprehensive and larger than the French one given the nature of the German policy-formulation process 
and the intense and publicly known collaboration between government and industry in managing the 
crisis. In terms of composition, both cases have shown that interest group concentration and structure – 
as in the case of Germany – as well as informal ties – as in the case of France – do matter significantly to 
gain influence. But the two cases also underline that the way influence is exerted on governments differs 
substantially from one system to another and is inherently linked to the institutional setting. The French 
system thereby clearly seems to favor business-groups over labor-groups. However, this link is not 
obvious at first sight, as the analysis above underlines that the nature of the polity in France leaves 
formally no room for any interest-group influence. It is rather the elite educational system that 
disproportionately favors the influence of business-groups and – naturally – makes the policy formulation 
process less transparent. Moreover, although Schmidt noted that by 2002 the French state had become 
less interventionist and “dirigiste” than it used to be (cf. Schmidt 2002: 148), the policy-formulation 
process still continues to be a “one-way street” in contrast to the process in Germany that is characterized 
by exchange and inclusion of different groups (cf. Bundesregierung 2013; Weßels 2007).  
In contrast, although many times pronounced dead (e.g. Lang/Schneider 2007: 221ff), the corporatist 
traditions in Germany have revived during the crisis. The short-time labor allowance is a very unique and 
precise example for the collaborative cooperation between state, labor and businesses (cf. Economist 
2013: 12) that took place during the crisis. This example also implies that measures beneficial to both – 
business and labor – were most effective in mitigating the crisis (ibid). Labor and business lobby groups 
seem to have been equally involved. The major lobby groups from both camps took an active role in 
presenting possible measures to the German government to fight the recession. The German government, 
in turn, has involved both groups equally as for example the composition of the steering counsel shows 
(“Lenkungssausschuss Unternehmensfinanzierung”, BMWi 2009). In other words, the by some 
comparativist scholars perceived “erosion of the arrangements that distinguished the coordinated political 
economies in the past” (Thelen 2012: 138) cannot be validated in the case of Germany. Instead the “state 
characteristics” of the German state as an “enabling facilitator” (Schmidt 2002: 113) as described by 
Schmidt seem to still hold true. 
In France in contrast, labor-groups face three major obstacles – that are supposedly all somewhat 
interdependent – when trying to influence policy outcomes. First of all, they do not have any formal 
consultation rights in the policy-formulation process (cf. Schmidt 2006:34f). Secondly, they lack the 
structural and organizational centralization and concentration that German trade-unions exhibit (cf. 
Weßels 2007: 97). And thirdly, they lack the informal ties with the French political elite that yield business-
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groups significant influence (cf. Kuper 2013). Thus, considering those three disadvantages French labor 
groups face and the fact that the French stimulus program contained so little labor supporting measures 
are strong indicators for validity of Hypothesis 2. The fact that German labor-groups were involved in 
consulting the German government and that the German stimulus program was characterized by a large 
share of labor supporting measures further justifies this conclusion.  
As mentioned above, the financial structure of an economy might serve well to distinguish LMEs from 
CMEs (cf. Hall/Soskice 2001: 16/22f)29, but when trying to assess the causes of differing policy-outcomes 
in managed economies and state-enhanced economies the financial structure does not – at least in the 
given case comparison – yield any clear findings. Lending to non-financial private sector companies has 
not been significantly higher in Germany than in France in the respective time period. The implication 
that French firms needed less direct financial support from their government cannot be confirmed. 
Therefore, the third hypothesis (H3) has to be rejected in this context. Nevertheless, one should keep in 
mind that the VoC-framework by Hall and Soskice (2001: 16/22) would normally state that firms in 
CMEs are less affected (financially) by external shocks, as they do not have the pressure by capital markets 
to “sustain their profitability” (ibid). However, as indicated above, this argument does not take into 
account that banks may face a lack of liquidity and therefore tighten lending conditions, as it was the case 
during the crisis (cf. ECB 2008). Even if I had compared a LME with a CME, the financial structure 
might have lacked explanatory power as the effects of banks as “patient” capital-providers might have 
countered the effects of the credit crunch.  
4.7 Critique of VoC-Approach and Limitations 
By now, one should have realized that Vivien Schmidt’s framework of VoC was the most suitable – or 
even only suitable – choice given the fact that this is the only (relevant) VoC-framework that specifically 
looks at the role of the government in an economy and therefore also allows for a third type of capitalism: 
State-led/-enhanced capitalism (cf. Schmidt 2002). Putting the firm at the center of the analysis appears to 
me rather problematic when analyzing the sources of policy-outcomes. Hence I would reject to purely rely 
on Hall and Soskice’s (2001) or Amable’s (2003) approach to VoC. Against the backdrop of assessing 
governmental decisions it is thus imperative and justified to use Schmidt’s framework, even though it is 
not what is commonly understood as VoC.  
Although Amable’s works exhibit a fair amount of quantitative empirical analysis, the general critique one 
can express concerning the most popular approach of Hall and Soskice (2001), but also concerning 
Schmidt (2002), is the rather thin quantitative analysis that makes the framework a somewhat heuristic 
one. This, of course, is to some extent also reflected in this research. Even though I presented a rich body 
of empirical data, particularly the influence of specific societal groups on the policy-formulation process is 
hard to track empirically. Specifically, the above mentioned “informal ties” in France are nearly impossible 
to prove from the outside. But the fact that the VoC-framework is somewhat heuristic is clearly tied to its 
nature. Whenever scholars used a more quantitative approach in the context of trying to cluster countries 
according to certain institutional characteristics, they ended up with not two or three but five (cf. Amable 
2003) or even more types of capitalism (cf. Alquist/Breunig 2009). The clustering of economies into 
manageable, easily distinguishable categories naturally brings some sort of simplification and thus 
heuristics with it.  
                                                 
29 or a market type of capitalism from a managed type of capitalism (cf. Schmidt 2002: 113ff/119ff). 
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Another aspect that should be kept in mind when using the VoC-approach as a framework to explain 
policy outcomes is that it is difficult to pinpoint to one specific aspect – such as government-industry 
relations – as having more explanatory power than another. It is possible to conclude that in the case of 
comparing a managed economy with a state-enhanced economy the financial structure does not serve well 
as a differentiating factor. But apart from that we can only conclude that the overall institutional 
configuration that has evolved historically (cf. Thelen 2012: 139) – be it that interest groups are consulted 
in the policy-formulation process or that the educational system is designed to create a small, homogenous 
elite – has a significant impact on policy-outcomes.  
Apart from the heuristic nature of the VoC-framework, the framework does not seem particularly flexible 
with respect to account for political dynamics. As mentioned above, Germany was in a very particular 
position politically in 2008/09. On the one hand, the government was made up of a grand coalition of the 
two major parties, CDU and SPD, which implied that business- as well as labor-groups had “political 
allies” (Thelen 2012:148) in power. This setting supposedly reinforced the corporatist nature of German 
industrial relations at that time. On the other hand, Germany’s politicians faced a general election in 
September 2009. The stimulus program was supposedly a good opportunity to give early campaign 
“goodies” to certain voting blocs. Both ruling parties had strong interest in having particular groups on 
their side and thus may have made concessions in the design of the stimulus program. France, in contrast, 
was governed by the conservative UMP under President Sarkozy. The next presidential elections would 
not come up until 2012. Therefore the political constellation in France was entirely different than the one 
in Germany at that time. This particular difference should thus also be kept in mind when evaluating the 
outcomes of the stimulus programs.  
5 Conclusion: Institutional Configuration Matters! 
When evaluating the results of this research, of course, one has to take the limited frame of this paper into 
account. Therefore the results should not be taken as given, but be regarded as an impulse to further 
engage in comparative institutionalist policy-research on the topic of economic stimulus programs. The 
starting point of this paper was the puzzle that countries that had seemingly similar economic 
preconditions had designed almost entirely different responses to the crisis. My hypothesis that a purely 
economic explanatory approach cannot help solving this issue seems to be validated. The VoC-approach, 
even though not used in its original, firm-centered form (cf. Hall/Soskice 2001), has provided a useful 
framework that served well to analyze and explain this phenomenon. Although the analysis showed that 
when comparing a managed type of capitalism with a state-enhanced type the financial structure does not 
work well as a distinguishing element, the overall results of the research underline the validity of the 
framework. Though not all elements have been included in the analysis, the general proposition that the 
institutional configuration of an economy had significant influence on the policy-outcomes in the frame of 
the financial and economic crisis in 2008/09 has been supported. Institutional characteristics that are, 
among others, reflected in the relations between government and businesses as well as government and 
labor groups have a significant impact on the design and composition of certain policies. In other words, 
even in the light of intensified integration on a European level, a convergence of institutional settings 
remains a myth. Even though countries increasingly face the same kind of issues, “because of existing 
domestic institutional settings, political dynamics [will continue to] differ across countries” (Thatcher 
2004: 754) and therefore the reaction to external shocks such as the global financial and economic crisis in 
2008/09 differed as well. Governments do not design their policies in an open space free from 
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institutional dependencies and pressures from societal interest groups, but in a highly country-specific 




Table  4: “Konjunktur- und wachstumspolitische Maßnahmen der Bundesregierung in der Wirtschafts- und 
Finanzkrise“ (BMWi 2010a) 
  
2009 2010 Total
Mrd. Euro Mrd. Euro Mrd. Euro
Entlastungspaket vom 7. Oktober 2008
Erhöhung Kindergeld- und Kinderfreibetrag 2,3 2,2
Senkung des Beitragssatzes zur Arbeitslosenversicherung auf 2,8% 4 4
Bessere Absetzbarkeit der Beiträge zur Kranken- und Pflegeversicherung - 8,4
Summe I 6 15 21
Konjunkturpaket I, November 2008
Beschleunigte Umsetzung von Verkehrsinvestitionen 1 1
Degressive Abschreibungen Anlagevermögen/Sonderabschreibung KMU 2,2 4,7
Kfz-Steuerbefreiung Neuwagen 0,4 0,1
Steuerliche Absetzbarkeit von Handwerkerleistungen - 1
Programm-Aufstockungen (CO2-Gebäudesanierung, KfW-Programm, Verbesserung der 
regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur) 0,3 0,4
Verlängerung Bezugsdauer Kurzarbeitergeld - -
Summe II 4 7 11
Konjunkturpaket II, Januar 2009
Bundesinvestitionen (Verkehr/Bau/Ausrüstung) 2 2
Investitionen von Bund und Ländern im Rahmen des Zukunftsinvestitionsgesetzes 6,7 6,7
Steuertarifsenkung und Kinderbonus 4,9 5,6
Beitragssatzsenkung zur gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung auf 14,9% 3,2 6,3
Beschäftigungssicherung 3,3 2,6
Erhöhung der Kinderregelleistung im SGB II von 60 auf 70 % 0,2 0,3
Kfz-Steuerbefreiung und Umweltprämie 5 0,2
Zentrales Innovationsprogramm Mittelstand (ZIM) 0,4 0,5
Mobilitätsforschung (Antriebstechnik) 0,2 0,3
Aufstockung Kredit- und Bürgschaftsprogramm (Wirtschaftsfonds D.) 0,3 0,7
Summe III 26 25 51
Wiedereinführung der vollen Pendlerpauschale 5,4 3,1 8,5
Befristete Entlastungen Unternehmensbesteuerung 0,8 0,9 2
Agrardiesel-Steuererleichterungen befristet - - 0,6
Wachstumsbeschleunigungsgesetz, November 2009
Erhöhung Kindergeld- und Kinderfreibetrag - 4,3
Korrekturen Verlustvortrag/Zinsschranke/Abschreibungen - 0,7
Korrektur Erbschaftsteuer/Biokraftstoffförderung - 0,3
Umsatzsteuersatz-Senkung Hotelgewerbe - 0,8
Summe Wachstumsbeschleunigungsgesetz - 6 6
Gesamtsumme 45 57 100
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